The world in 1979, half-way between Hiroshima and today, is already beginning to look exotic in the rearview mirror. Jimmy Carter was still the US president, Margaret Thatcher became the UK's prime minister, while Leonid Brezhnev still presided over the Soviet Union. In February 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran ended a monarchy that had just celebrated its 2500 th anniversary seven years earlier, and at the end of the year the Soviet Union intervened in the civil war in Afghanistan, which led to the boycott of the 1980 Olympics at Moscow by many western countries.
Meanwhile, the western world kept wondering what direction China might take after the death of its revolutionary leader Mao Zedong in September 1976. The trial of the Gang of Four and the power struggle between communist hardliners led by Hua Guofeng and more marketoriented reformers under Deng Xiaoping left the outside world guessing. At the beginning of 1979, the Carter administration recognised the People's Republic of China, rather than Taiwan, as the legitimate representation of China, and Deng Xiaoping's faction was beginning to steer the country towards a more capitalist future.
At that point, China's economy was still dominated by agriculture. Around 80% of workers were employed in this sector, which still relied on manual work and used every scrap of land available. The population was approaching the one-billion mark and growing steadily. It had nearly doubled in the previous 30 years since the beginnings of the People's Republic. As the country had neither spare land to farm nor established industries to produce goods for export, population growth became a threat to food security, and the authorities were beginning to try out various soft and not quite so soft measures to curb the fertility rates. Young people were encouraged to delay their procreation, and women who had two children already were threatened with sterilisation should they fall pregnant again.
In 1979 the Chinese leadership announced a new drastic set of rules that became known as the one-child policy. It is based on the household registration system (hukou), which differentiates between urban and rural populations. Residents of urban areas were strictly allowed only one child. Exceptions for rural areas allowed a second child if the firstborn was a girl, thus giving in to a culturally engrained preference for sons, which also led to selective abortions and infanticides, shifting the gender balance significantly.
Violation of the rules could be punished with fines amounting to several annual salaries of the household concerned, but the strictness of implementation varied by region.
Little emperors
Now, after a generation has grown up under the one-child policy, the population has grown to 1.35 billion, which is an increase of only 35% compared to a doubling in the Feature previous 34 years. The total fertility rate, i.e. the number of children a woman has on average over her lifetime, was estimated at 1.55 children per woman (all current population data are 2013 estimates from the CIA World Factbook, accessed 16.1.2014: https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ch.html). Some praise the policy for avoiding 300 to 400 million births, while others criticise it as a violation of human rights.
Meanwhile, China has become the world's second largest economy, with its sights set on overtaking the US. It has landed a rover on the moon and set up a world leading genomics centre. The one-child policy, although successful in averting an imminent population disaster, has burdened China with two major demographic side-effects, namely the increasing prevalence of people who grew up as their parents' only child, and the rapid inversion of the age pyramid.
Lisa Cameron from Monash University in Clayton, Australia, and colleagues have studied the psychological impact of the policy by testing individuals from two cohorts born before the policy (in 1975 and 1978) in comparison to two cohorts born under the policy (in 1980 or 1983) . The authors emphasize that they are not testing for the effects of being an only child -some of those born before 1979 had no siblings, while some of those from the two later cohorts did. Rather, they are testing for the impact of the wider societal context, where being an only child becomes the norm (Science (2013) 339, 953-957).
The single children born under the one-child policy have become nicknamed 'little emperors', as it is often assumed that they have been spoilt by the attention of their parents being focused on them and that they have failed to acquire certain social and co-operative behaviours due to the lack of siblings.
Testing a total of 421 individuals born either side of 1979 in Beijing, where the policy was strictly enforced, Cameron and colleagues applied established economic experiments for traits including altruism, trust, trustworthiness, willingness to take risks, and competitiveness. For instance, in the risk game, participants are given a sum of money, of which they can choose any amount to invest in a venture that may with equal probability triple their investment or wipe it out completely. The percentage of the initial fund they are willing to invest is recorded as a measure of their attitude towards risk.
On all these parameters, the cohorts born after the introduction of the one-child policy scored significantly lower than those born before. The 'little emperors' thus emerged as less altruistic, less trusting, less trustworthy, more risk-averse and less competitive than the generations born before 1979. As there were two age cohorts on either side of the divide, the authors could also control for effects of age. In further studies conducted with standard questionnaires, the post-1979 cohorts also scored higher on neuroticism and lower on optimism and conscientiousness than the older groups.
The birth cohorts tested in this study still have extended families relatively unaffected by the policy, as their parents still have siblings. The average number of cousins is only slightly reduced from 7.4 to 7.0 between the two groups compared. One generation down the line, as the children of the one-child policy become parents themselves, this support system is set to disappear. The authors conclude: "Under such circumstances, we would expect that the policy's effect would, if anything, be magnified."
The softening of the policy that has officially been sanctioned last December may alleviate its impact on extended families, as it allows couples a second child if one of them was an only child. Xin Meng, a co-author of the little emperors study, suggests that, while the policy change won't affect the rural majority, some of the urban population may take the opportunity: "based on our own data, those who grew up as a single child because of the one-child policy are 30 per cent more likely to want to have more children keeping everything else constant." This additional exception may also help to avoid that the first generation to be allowed only one child will also be limited to one grandchild, which leads us to the second demographic problem.
Who will care for the elderly?
Due to the one-child policy, China is facing the same demographic problem as Japan and many European countries. The drop of fertility rates below the replacement level of just over two children per woman combined with rising life expectancy means that the size of the retirement age population grows rapidly in relation to the working age population.
In European countries, this demographic change happened gradually, drawn out over the six decades since the post-war baby boom. In China, it only took two decades. According to 2013 figures, 9.4% of the population are now over 65. In 30 years, when the first children of the one-child-policy reach that age, this share could be several times higher.
The calculation is simple -for every 65-year-old couple, there will be only 1.5 children aged around 40, and only 1.125 teenage grandchildren. Depending on future shifts to the average life expectancy (currently standing at 75 years overall, 77 for women, 73 for men), the age group over 65 could easily exceed one third of the population. This dramatic Growing old: Due to the drastic and sudden reduction in fertility rates, the age distribution in China is changing much faster than in western countries, where fertility declined more slowly. (Photo: © Steve Evans (http://babasteve.blogspot.co.uk/).) change comes with multiple economic problems. The financing of pensions will put an excessive burden on the shrinking population of working age, threatening the country's seemingly unstoppable economic growth.
Care for a growing elderly population with chronic diseases, disability, or dementia will become a major challenge. Already, only a very small percentage of the elderly find places in nursing homes, and many rely on family members for their care. After two generations of one-child policy, however, a single grandchild may have to take responsibility for four grandparents at the time when they would like to start their own family.
These considerations may also be playing a part in the gradual softening of the one-child policy. Maybe the new government is trying to slowly steer the fertility rate a bit closer to the replacement level, which would allow them to manage the population as a steady-state system.
At the same time, the government could also gain support from those people who still resent the state's intervention in their family planning. Commenting on the recent case of the film director Zhang Yimou, who was fined for having three children, Yuan Ren stated in an opinion piece published online by the Guardian that "the one-child-policy […] is in fact an affront to traditional beliefs. While economic growth in China has manifested in an improved quality of life and a ravaging consumerist culture, couples and grandparents look to find true meaning in the bliss of a different prosperity: the children of the next generation."
One final demographic problem is the product of the collision of the policy with the traditional preference of male offspring. By a combination of selective abortion and infanticide, parents have raised the gender ratio to a staggering 1.15:1 (CIA Factbook -other sources even cite 1.18). The natural ratio is 1.07, as nature likes to produce a few spares, probably accounting for fights and general recklessness in the male of the species. So for every 100 boys born, the number of girls is being reduced by 6.6 in one way or another. Multiply that with 16 million births per year, and you have 528,000 females missing every year, not to mention a similar number of males who will be frustrated in their search for a wife.
Lessons for the world?
Since the one-child policy was introduced in 1979, the population explosion has slowed down significantly, both in China and globally. In the 1970s, environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich predicted global disasters based on overpopulation. By now, we have become hardened to this outlook, as population is only one of around a dozen horsemen of our coming apocalypse (Curr. Biol. (2013) , 23, R1017-R1020).
Other problems, particularly climate change, but also the ecological footprint of individuals in wealthier countries, as well as the loss of biodiversity and habitat, are taking centre stage. China's population control has worked so well that it can now be loosened, and its total population is expected to peak around 2030, at just under 1.4 billion (UN estimates from 2010).
In the rest of the world, a list of countries ranked by total fertility rate (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ sovereign_states_and_dependent_ territories_by_fertility_rate) reveals that there are only very few hotspots of unsustainable human reproduction left around the globe. Large parts of sub-Saharan Africa maintain high total fertility rates, with Niger leading the field with just over 7 births per woman, followed by Mali with 6.25. However, these rates are counterbalanced by high mortalities, and experts have argued that a reduction in child mortality, combined with economic development, would reduce these rates, as women often factor the expected losses into their family planning. Access to contraception and women's rights to control their own fertility are also issues that still need to be addressed in some parts of the world.
Outside Africa, only Afghanistan and East Timor have a fertility rate higher than four, and only a few countries fall in the range of three to four children per woman. Like China, India has also made progress in controlling its population growth. Its population stands at 1.22 billion, with a total fertility rate around 2.55 -although India also has a suspicious shortage of female births, with a sex ratio at birth of 1.12:1. At current trends, world population may level off at a headcount somewhere near 10 billion by the end of the century (UN projection from 2010).
Environmentalists including Paul Ehrlich are still calling to further slow its growth and humanely reduce the peak height of global population. However, the example of China also suggests that only an authoritarian regime could enforce such drastic deviation from what a majority of people want for their family life.
Thus, barring catastrophes, the best hope for tighter population control is probably that development will naturally reduce the family size everywhere, as it has done across Europe. Even in France, which competes with Ireland for the title of the EU's most fertile member state, the total fertility rate dropped below reproduction level last year. Other European countries, including Germany, are most worried about how to raise it to get closer to a steady state and save the provisions for the elderly from collapse.
The threat of an exponential 'explosion' of world population appears to have subsided. New demographic challenges have replaced it, from the age distribution and gender balance through to migration between countries and also within countries. For instance, the rapid growth of China's economy has depended on an unprecedented migration of around 200 million people from rural areas to the cities, as Xin Meng explains in a recent book review (Science (2014) 343, 138-139) . The next challenge for governments in China, India, and other populous countries is now to fine-tune the development and mobility of their populations in ways that are both sustainable and acceptable to the people.
Michael Gross is a science writer based at Oxford. He can be contacted via his web page at www.michaelgross.co.uk China's dream: In economic terms, China has been spectacularly successful in the last decades, but will demographic challenges end its rise? (Photo: Stephen Codrington.) What turned you on to biology in the first place? Music led me to science. When I started college, I didn't know what I wanted to 'be when I grew up'. Frankly, I wasn't very excited about going to college in general, but I enrolled at the University of Texas (UT Austin) in an honors liberal arts program (called Plan II) that introduced me to an intellectual group of people (mostly in the humanities, but some scientists as well). I discovered rapidly that college was NOT merely a continuation of high school and that I loved the intellectual environment. However, 'liberal arts' wasn't an attractive career aspiration. I've always liked challenges and since everyone else seemed to want to be a physician and it was one of the most competitive majors, I declared as a premed along with the liberal arts major.
Carl Hirschie Johnson
However, in my first year at UT, I took a music appreciation course and fell in love with classical music. I attended every concert that I could get into and became enamored with the idea of becoming the conductor of a major symphony orchestra (it remains a fond pipe dream!). I began piano and violin classes, as well as theory courses for the music majors. However, I had never had music lessons as a child and it was too late for me at the age of 19 to develop the 'ear'. Alas! An unfulfilled dream.
Q & A
Nevertheless, it was music that led me to science. I've always had a passable singing voice and since I had never learned any other instrument, developing voice as my 'instrument' was the only logical course of action. However, voice lessons cost money and my widow mother was barely able to afford my tuition/fees/food. There was nothing left over for something as frivolous as voice lessons. So, I needed to get a job to earn money for voice lessons. There was a biology professor whose class I had enjoyed in my freshman year and I went to ask that professor for a job. His name is Michael Menaker (now a professor at the University of Virginia) and he was the first person who had a really profound impact on my decision to become a scientist. When I asked him for a job, he looked at me sideways (he knew who I was because I had asked a lot of questions in class) and said, "Yeah . . . I've got a job for you" and he put me to work in the lab. That began a working relationship with Dr. Menaker that would last the remainder of my undergraduate career.
I earned the money to take voice lessons, but more importantly I learned that I liked scientific research. I've always felt that research was like playing a chess game against nature. I resonate with a quote from Sir Peter Medawar that "the art of research is that of making (an apparently intractable) problem soluble by finding out (experimental) ways of getting at it -soft underbellies and the like". Despite gravitating to research, however, I wasn't very successful at it as an undergraduate (or for most
